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The Development of THAAD
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, 
better known as THAAD, is a system devel-
oped by Lockheed Martin. Production began 
in 1992 and the first contract with the U.S. 
government was signed in January 2007.1  
The main purpose of THAAD is to defend 
U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers 
and critical infrastructure from short- and 
medium-range missiles. It destroys threats 
within and outside the earth’s atmosphere.2  
 
Technical Specifications
The THAAD system consists of five parts: 
1. launchers, 
2. missiles, 
3. fire control, 
4. the THAAD radar, 
5. support equipment. 
THAAD missiles are 6,17 meters in length 
and have a single stage solid fuel rocket mo-
tor with thrust, giving them a launch weight 
of 900 kilograms. They have a range of 200 
kilometers and can reach up to 150 kilome-
ters in altitude, this is higher than any other 
missile defense systems. The radar, on the 
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other hand, can identify missile threats up to 
1,000 kilometers in range.3
To defend, THAAD missile uses kinetic 
energy. THAAD is able to destroy an incom-
ing missile through collision (hit-to-kill). 
A typical THAAD battery consists of nine 
launch vehicles, two fire control centers, and 
a ground-based radar. The launch vehicles 
are 12 meters in length and 3.25 meters wide 
and are equipped with eight missiles.4  
There are two possible modes for THAAD. 
The first is the forward-based mode, in which 
the system would be aimed at target detec-
tion and tracking of missiles during the boost 
phase. The second is terminal mode, with 
the aim of target acquisition, tracking, and 
discrimination for fire control of the THAAD 
battery.5  
Interception Sequence
The sequence of a THAAD interception 
would start with an enemy launching a 
missile. The missile would be detected by 
the THAAD radar system when falling into 
range and the information would be relayed 
to the fire control center. The fire control 
center would then instruct the launch of an 
interceptor missile. The target object data 
and predicted intercept point would be 
downloaded to the missile and the missile 
would be fired from the launcher at the 
enemy projectile.6 The information on the 
target and interception would continuously 
be transmitted to the missile while in flight 
and the enemy projectile would be destroyed 
when it re-enters the atmosphere (terminal 
phase). The THAAD system would then 
have another three interceptor missiles to 
fire with each individual battery taking 30 
minutes to reload.7  
Success Rate and Acquisition
According to official Lockheed Martin data, 
THAAD has maintained a 100% mission 
Figure 1: THAAD launch sequence
3InstItute for securIty & Development polIcy – www.IsDp.eu 
When compared with alternative systems, 
THAAD can also intercept a wider range 
of threats. It can intercept both exo- and 
endo-atmospheric threats, while the Aegis 
BMD can only intercept exo-atmospheric 
threats and the Patriot-PAC-3, only endo-at-
mospheric threats.10 In addition, THAAD is 
inter-operable with other BMDS, making it 
possible to have an integrated air and mis-
sile defense system. THAAD can also be 
used against weapons of mass destruction, 
i.e., chemical, nuclear and biological war-
heads.11
Weaknesses
There are, however, certain limitations to 
the THAAD system. First of all, THAAD 
may not be efficient against missiles with an 
irregular and unstable trajectory as the inter-
ceptor missile has to precisely hit and de-
stroy the front side of an incoming missile.12  
Another challenge is for THAAD's radar to 
differentiate between real warheads and de-
success rate over its last 13 development and 
operational tests, which included 11 success-
ful intercepts.8 U.S. Missile Defense Agency 
tests reflect the same rate of success. The 
first foreign military sale of THAAD was in 
September 2008 to the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Three THAAD fire units were sold, 
with 147 missiles, four THAAD radars, six 
fire control centers and nine launchers. Two 
additional THAAD systems and the support 
equipment were purchased again by the 
UAE in 2011.9  
Strengths
One of the main characteristics of THAAD 
is the ease of transportation which make it 
possible to quickly reposition THAAD. This 
gives THAAD greater flexibility to respond 
to changing threats. Whilst alternative Bal-
listic Missile Defense System (BMDS), such 
as the Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC-3, are 
also transportable, they have a more limited 
range.
Figure 2: Diagram of a THAAD Missile
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35 kilometers. Other than THAAD, South 
Korea will also be developing an indepen-
dent Korean Air and Missile Defense system 
(KAMD) which will serve as lower-altitude 
interceptors. As THAAD will be inter-op-
erable with these systems, South Korea 
would have a multi-layered defensive shield 
against attacks from North Korea.17
Funding
Based on the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA), the responsibility to provide for the 
land and relevant facilities to host THAAD is 
held by South Korea.18 The U.S., on the other 
hand, will provide funding for the deploy-
ment and operation of a single THAAD sys-
tem. One THAAD battery will cost around 
US$1.3 billion or 1.49 trillion won. Funding 
for the purchase of additional THAAD sys-
tems is still undetermined.
Attacks from the Sea
Only a single THAAD battery is planned to 
be installed in South Korea. It is still un-
clear whether this will be enough to defend 
against North Korean submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As the THAAD 
coys. The radar bases its data on the exterior 
properties of the missile, such as its shape 
and brightness.13 When a real warhead is 
launched among decoys, it would be difficult 
for the THAAD radar to accurately identi-
fy it. Therefore, the probability exists that 
the THAAD missile will hit a decoy missile 
while the real warhead continues towards 
the target.
THAAD Deployment in South 
Korea
The Need for THAAD
The U.S. has been proposing the deploy-
ment of THAAD in the Korean Peninsula 
since 2014, but it was only in early February 
2016 that official discussions started. This 
was largely a result of North Korea’s fourth 
nuclear test that was conducted in January 
2016. After a series of consultations, the 
decision to deploy THAAD was made public 
by the Park Geun-hye administration on July 
7th, 2016. The decision was seemingly made 
overnight and did not go through a ratifi-
cation process which is required for treaties 
that would “significantly transform the secu-
rity environment of South Korea.”14  
According to a joint statement between 
the U.S. and South Korea, the purpose of 
THAAD is to act as a “defensive measure to 
ensure the security of ROK and its people, 
and to protect Alliance military forces from 
North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missile threats.”15 South Korea 
would be protected against potential nuclear, 
biological, or chemical attacks from its north-
ern neighbor and, in addition, Pyongyang 
would also be limited in its ability to engage 
in coercive diplomacy.16
South Korea’s Defense Capacity
South Korea currently has the Patriot Ad-
vanced Capability (PAC) system, a defense 
system with an operational range of 20 to 
Figure 3: 2015 North Korean SLBM Test
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porters increased, as August 12, 2016 Gallup 
polls showed that 56% were in favor while 
31% were opposed.21 Those who were in 
favor of THAAD mentioned national secu-
rity and safety as their main considerations, 
while those who are against it were worried 
that the decision will negatively impact 
the country’s relationship with China and 
Russia. Some respondents also expressed 
a reluctance to be increasingly dependent 
upon the U.S. military.
Almost half of the respondents of the Gal-
lup Korea poll in July supported the idea of 
hosting the THAAD battery in their neigh-
borhood, compared to the 29% who said 
that they would be against it.22 However, 
there were challenges in deciding the loca-
tion of THAAD. Areas with U.S. military 
bases were considered, such as Pyeongtaek, 
Wonju, Waegwan, and Gunsan. Eumseong 
County and Beolgyo, which are locations 
without U.S. bases, were also mentioned.23
On July 22, it was announced that THAAD 
would be installed on a South Korean Air 
Force base in Seongju County by the end of 
2017.24 Seongju County is located around 
217 kilometers southeast of Seoul and its Air 
Force Base currently hosts a Hawk ground-
to-air missile battery. The southern-central 
region was strategically chosen in order 
to protect Busan, Ulsan and Pohang from 
North Korean missile attacks. These are 
areas where South Korean and U.S. rein-
forcements and supplies would be located 
during an attack.25 However, positioning 
THAAD in Seongju (figure 4) would not 
protect Seoul. To defend Seoul, the current 
PAC defense system of the South Korean 
army will be upgraded.26 THAAD's position-
ing in Seongju County was considered as a 
cost-saving measure since the THAAD could 
be installed alongside the existing Hawk 
battery without the need of purchasing any 
additional land.27
radar only has a 120-degree field of view, it 
is possible for a North Korean submarine 
to travel outside of the range before firing. 
Based on analysis of North Korea’s test in 
August 2016, it is estimated that the SLBM 
would be able to travel over 1,000 kilometers 
on a minimum trajectory, making it possible 
for SLBMs to be launched further from the 
radar range.19 At least two THAAD batter-
ies would be needed to cover all of North 
Korea’s sea and intercept possible SLBM 
attacks. 
Positioning THAAD
The people of South Korea have held dif-
fering opinions on the decision of THAAD 
deployment. According to a Gallup Korea 
poll, after the announcement of THAAD 
deployment, 50% of the 1,004 respondents 
were in favor of the decision while 32% were 
against it.20 Over time, the number of sup-
Figure 4: Seongju- the original location for THAAD
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tial areas would ease residents concerns of 
radiation. 
However, there is currently opposition from 
the residents of Gimcheon. The residents 
along with city council members have con-
ducted a demonstration in Seoul, claiming 
fear of radiation and that Gimcheon will 
become a military target.37 They also shaved 
their head in protest, mirroring what was 
done in Seongju.38 Demonstrators were 
accompanied by Won Buddhist, as the golf 
course is also located 500 meters from a sa-
cred ground for their religion.39 In addition, 
the new location will be more expensive; the 
price of the golf course is over US$91 million 
or 100 billion won and parliamentary ap-
proval is needed for the budget.40
Impact on the Region
North Korea’s Response
North Korea has viewed the decision to de-
ploy THAAD as both a provocation and an 
act of aggression. Their response has been to 
continue missile development and invest in 
technologies that could bypass systems like 
THAAD.
The People’s Reaction to THAAD
The people of Seongju, however, did not ap-
prove of the decision. The inhabitants contin-
ually expressed their discontent citing  health 
concerns due to radiation and loss of land 
for the THAAD installation.28 The radiation 
claims have been disputed by the U.S., but 
experts disagree whether the safe distance 
from a THAAD radar is 100 meters or 3.6 
kilometers.29 Some residents also expressed 
concerns that there would be an increase in 
loud bars, drunken soldiers, prostitution, 
and other illicit activities that have been 
prevalent around many of the U.S. military 
bases throughout South Korea.30  
Furthermore, there is the fear that the pres-
ence of THAAD will make Seongju a military 
target.31 900 residents protested THAAD by 
shaving their heads in August 2016.32 They 
also managed to collect 100,000 signatures 
for a petition against THAAD, which was 
sent to the White House.33
The decision to choose Seongju as the loca-
tion for the THAAD battery has also been 
considered as undemocratic. Local residents 
claimed that they had not been consulted un-
til after the decision was made. The county 
governor also stated that he had only learned 
of the decision through media reports.34 
Due to the high number of protests, the 
South Korean government decided to 
change the location and considered three 
new alternatives: Mt. Kkachi in Sooryoon, 
Mt. Yeomsok in Geumsoo, and Mt. Dalma 
in Chojeon.35 Considering the operation-
al effectiveness, resident health concerns, 
infrastructure, overall safety considerations, 
construction time and cost, and the required 
time for installation, it was finally decided 
that THAAD would be deployed on Mt. Dal-
ma in Chojeon.
The new location of Mt. Dalma in Chojeon is 
currently used as a Lotte-owned golf course. 
It is located 18 kilometers north of Seongju 
county center and 300 meters higher than the 
South Korean Air Force base.36 The higher 
altitude and greater distance from residen-
Figure 5: Seongju residents protest against THAAD
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Correspondingly, one day after the an-
nouncement of THAAD deployment, North 
Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) 
SLBM.41 This was followed by three short-
range missiles that were fired six days after 
the announcement and another two interme-
diate-range missiles in early August 2016.42 
North Korea has also stated that they will 
retaliate with a “physical response.”43 
The continuous missile development by 
North Korea could be seen as tests for by-
passing THAAD’s abilities, as it is possible to 
launch more missiles than a missile defense 
can intercept.44 So far, only one THAAD bat-
tery is planned to be deployed which could 
be a critical weakness. THAAD’s difficulty in 
intercepting missiles with irregular trajecto-
ries could also be used; in theory, North Ko-
rea's medium-range Rodong missiles would 
be able to bypass THAAD as they have an 
irregular trajectory.45 
Recent analysis suggests that North Korea 
is developing a new submarine that would 
be larger than the previous GORAE-class ex-
perimental ballistic missile submarine.46 The 
improvement of SLBMs, could be considered 
another weakness of THAAD and would 
give a critical advantage to North Korea. In 
any case, North Korea have continued their 
nuclear development, conducting a fifth 
nuclear test in September 2016.47
China’s Dilemma
Even before official THAAD discussions 
started, China expressed their opposi-
tion to the system. Although China is also 
against North Korean nuclear development, 
THAAD is seen as an attempt to obscure 
China’s strategic interests in the region.48 
There are several reasons for this position. 
First is China’s fear that THAAD could be 
used to intercept Chinese missiles. Both 
the U.S. and South Korea have denied this 
by stating that THAAD will only be used 
against North Korea.49 The THAAD battery 
will be placed in terminal mode, thus mak-
ing it unable to detect Chinese interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Further-
more, THAAD will be poorly positioned 
against Chinese intermediate-range missiles 
launched at South Korea or Japan. The 
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Conclusion
The deployment of THAAD in South Korea 
is a symbolic issue. The ROK has tradi-
tionally balanced its security interests be-
tween China and America. The inclusion of 
THAAD into South Korea's missile defense 
would certainly tip the scales towards a 
ROK-U.S. alliance.
From a U.S. perspective, North Korea's 
advancing nuclear program and the looming 
presidential election have made Pentagon of-
ficials push for THAAD as soon as possible. 
In their minds, cooperation between them, 
Japan and the U.S. would increase overall 
stability and security.
However, it is not that simple. THAAD's 
effectiveness is debatable. Further, there is 
still no political consensus on the viability 
of THAAD and there is a distinct concern 
that its deployment may jeopardize relations 
with China. The People’s Party, (part of the 
opposition) are against THAAD deploy-
ment. As are the Minjoo Party which main-
tain that the decision to deploy THAAD was 
mainly done by prioritizing the US-ROK 
alliance over South Korea’s own interests. 
The fact that the ratification process was 
bypassed by the Park Geun Hye administra-
tion has also been a key point of contention. 
All of these factors may cancel THAAD, or, 
at the very least, delay THAAD deployment 
at a time when co-operation and stability is 
most needed.
location of THAAD will allow it to intercept 
missiles from Tonghua, which will follow the 
same trajectory as those from North Korea, 
but not missiles from Dengshahe, Laiwu and 
Hanchang.
However, a Pentagon report has shown 
that it is possible to change the system into 
forward-based mode in just eight hours.50 Once 
in this mode, the radar’s range would in-
crease to 3,000 kilometers, making it possible 
to detect Chinese ICBMs heading towards 
the U.S. However, THAAD missiles would 
not be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs in 
their boost and mid-range phases, but the 
information could be transferred to the early 
warning radar at the Clear Air Force Station 
in Alaska. This would make it possible for a 
warhead to be tracked from a greater dis-
tance than as is possible currently.51 There is 
also the fact that two THAAD radars have 
already been stationed in Japan. An addition-
al system in South Korea would better enable 
precise detection as the radar will be 1,000 
kilometers closer to China. The installation 
of THAAD in South Korea could be seen to 
be an additional part of a larger U.S. missile 
defense system.
Another worry for China is the stronger rela-
tionship between South Korea, the U.S., and 
Japan.52 Through the deployment of THAAD, 
South Korea would have a long-term com-
mitment with the U.S. strengthening its pres-
ence in Northeast Asia. China would have a 
lesser role in South Korea’s national security 
decision-making because of South Korea’s 
larger dependence on the U.S.
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